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Abstract
The United States was one of only seven nations to vote against the treaty. The ensuing debate
within the United States has properly focused on whether the United States can and should ratify
the treaty or, if not, whether as a non-party the United States should support or oppose the new
court. Largely overlooked, however, are two separate but related questions: (1) should the existing,
incomplete jurisdiction of U.S. courts over crimes within the ICC Statute be expanded to ensure
that such crimes may also be prosecuted in U.S. courts, under universal jurisdiction or other bases
allowed by international law?; (2) should the existing, incomplete codification in the United States
of crimes within the ICC Statute likewise be expanded to ensure that they are also crimes under
our national law? This Essay suggests that the answer to both questions is yes.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. courts have only incomplete and uneven jurisdiction,
most acquired piecemeal and only in recent years, to prosecute
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed
outside our borders. Recent developments in international law
and practice-especially the heightened commitment of democ-
racies, including the United States, to end impunity for atroci-
ties, and the imminent prospect of a permanent International
Criminal Court (or "ICC") with worldwide jurisdiction-suggest
the need to expand and rationalize the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts to make it coextensive with that of the ICC.
It now appears all but certain that the ICC will come into
being in the first years of the twenty-first century. On July 17,
1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court
("Rome Conference") adopted the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court ("ICC Statute") by a vote of 120 nations in
favor, seven opposed, and twenty-one abstentions.1 Its initial ju-
risdiction will cover genocide, crimes against humanity, and seri-
ous war crimes. 2 Sixty nations are required for the treaty to go
* Director, Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern University
School of Law, Chicago; former Legal Adviser, United Nations Commission on the
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1. UNITED NATIONS, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF AN INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998) (adopted by United Nations on July 17, 1998)
(visited Jan. 13, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icc>; reprinted in 37 I.L.M. § 999 (1998)
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
2. Id. arts. 5-8. Article I provides that the International Criminal Court (or "ICC")
shall have jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes of international concern." Id. at
art. 1. The crime of aggression, and perhaps other crimes, may be added, but not
sooner than seven years after the treaty enters into force, and then only if approved by
seven-eighths of the states parties. Id. at arts. 5.1(d), 5.2, 121, and 123.
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into effect;3 as of this writing in late 1999, eighty-nine nations
have signed the treaty.4
The United States was one of only seven nations to vote
against the treaty.5 The ensuing debate within the United States
has properly focused on whether the United States can and
should ratify the treaty or, if not, whether as a non-party the
United States should support or oppose the new court.6 Largely
overlooked, however, are two separate but related questions: (1)
should the existing, incomplete jurisdiction of U.S. courts over
crimes within the ICC Statute be expanded to ensure that such
crimes may also be prosecuted in U.S. courts, under universal
jurisdiction or other bases allowed by international law?; (2)
should the existing, incomplete codification in the United States
of crimes within the ICC Statute likewise be expanded to ensure
that they are also crimes under our national law?
This Essay suggests that the answer to both questions is yes.
Regardless of whether the United States ultimately joins the ICC,
U.S. courts should have the jurisdiction and codification neces-
sary to prosecute the crimes within the ICC Statute. ICCjurisdic-
tion is merely "complementary to national criminal jurisdic-
tions, ' regardless of whether the nations involved are parties to
the ICC. U.S. courts will need jurisdiction co-extensive with that
3. Id. at art. 126.
4. See Non-governmental Coalition for International Criminal Court ("ICC")
<http://www.iccnow.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (updating
list continuously). While to date only four states (Italy, San Marino, Senegal, and Trini-
dad and Tobago) have ratified the treaty, this reflects the time lag between signature
and completion of domestic ratification processes. Id.
5. There is some dispute about the identities of the seven opposing countries,
since the vote was not recorded. Professor Michael Scharf reports that they were China,
Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the United States, and Yemen. See Michael Scharf, The ICC's
Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Reply to Ambassador Scheffer, in LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 2 (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript on file with author).
6. See e.g., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Toward an International Criminal Court?
(1999) (having contributions by Anne-Marie Slaughter, Kenneth Roth, John Bolton,
and Ruth Wedgwood); David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Perspectives Favoring the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 52 J. INT'L AFF. 795 (1999); Alfred P.
Rubin, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom: Another View of the International Criminal
Court, 52J. INT'L AFF. 783 (1999); Douglass Cassel, The Rome Treaty for an International
Criminal Court: A Flawed but Essential First Step, 6 BROWNJ. WORLD AFF. 41 (1999); Scharf,
supra note 5; Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party
States, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2000) (draft manuscript on file with au-
thor).
7. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
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of the ICC, in order for the United States to be assured that it
can exercise its right, even as a non-party, to take preemptive
jurisdiction under the ICC Statute.8 In addition, whether or not
we join the ICC, U.S. courts need jurisdiction and laws to ensure
that those who commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and
serious war crimes, and who then come to or are brought to the
United States, can be prosecuted in the United States, in the
event the ICC cannot or does not take jurisdiction.
The imminence of the ICC thus provides both occasion and
stimulus to expand U.S. jurisdictional and criminal laws to cover
those crimes within the ICC's initial mandate. Wholly apart
from the ICC, however, U.S. laws should be updated to provide
for universal jurisdiction to prosecute such serious crimes if we
are to make real our oft-stated commitment to bring to justice
those who commit the most serious violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law.9 Our courts already have
wide-ranging civil jurisdiction over atrocities, regardless of where
they are committed, whenever the defendant is found in our ter-
ritory. "' In criminal jurisdiction, however, we lag behind such
other democracies as Australia," Belgium, 12 Canada,' 3 Den-
8. Id. arts. 17.1(a)-(c), 18, 20.3.
9. See e.g., Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Commencement Address, Ge-
orgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service 4 (May 29, 1999) <http://www.secretary.
state.gov/statements/1999> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) ("If we
are to accept what Milosevic is doing, we would invite further atrocities from him and
encourage others to follow his example. That's ... why we strongly support the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal, which earlier this week indicted Milosevic..."); Clinton
Supports International Criminal Court by Year 2000, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 22, 1997
("To punish those responsible for crimes against humanity-and to promote justice so
that peace endures-we must maintain our strong support for the UN's war crimes
tribunals . . ."); The Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, 22 U.S.C. 2656, pt. D, § 572 (a)
(1994) ("Consistent with international law, it is the policy of the United States to sup-
port efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against
humanity..."); U.S. Urges War Trials for Serbs, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 1992
("Eagleburger called Yugoslavia 'a shocking reminder that barbarity exists within our
midst and that we cannot call the new Europe either civilized or secure until we have
developed stronger mechanisms for dealing with this and similar crimes"').
10. See e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
11. See Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501 (Austl.) (citing trial
in Australia for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against Jews in
Ukraine).
12. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 554, 577, n.121 (1995) (discussing Belgian arrest warrant for Rwandan alleged
to have massacred other Rwandans in Rwanda, issued under 1993 Belgian law establish-
ing universal jurisdiction over war crimes).
13. Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (citing Canadian Supreme Courtjudgment
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mark, 4 France,' 5 Germany,' 6 Israel, 7 Italy,' 8 Spain, 9 Switzer-
land,2° and the United Kingdom,2' in ensuring that our courts
have jurisdiction to bring to trial the "enemies of all human-
ity.22
I. ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
23
Customary international law permits states to exercise uni-
on trial for crimes against humanity committed againstJews in Hungary); see alsoJudith
Bello & Irwin Cotler, International Decisions: Regina v. Finta, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 460
(1996).
14. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334,
341 (1999) (citing Director of Public Prosecutions v. T, Danish trial of Croatian na-
tional for war crimes committed against Bosnians in former Yugoslavia).
15. See Four File Complaints in France Against Former Haitian Dictator, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 10, 1999 (discussing criminal complaints against former Haitian dictator
Jean-Claude Duvalier and noting expansion of French law on crimes against humanity
for actions committed after 1994).
16. SeeJohn R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, German Federal Supreme Court Upholds Its
Jurisdiction To Prosecute Serb National for Genocide Based on His Role in "Ethnic Cleansing"
That Occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 5 INT'L LAw UPDATE 52 (May 1999) (discussing
German trial of Bosnian Serb for genocide in Bosnia); Frank Tiggelaar, Domovina Net,
April 27, 1999 (on file with author) (discussing German trial of Ukrainian-German who
came to Germany in 1994 for murdering inmates in Majdanek concentration camp in
Poland during World War II).
17. See Atty. Gen. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 279, 304 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962) (citing trial
in Israel of former German Nazi official for crimes against the Jewish people, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes committed in Europe).
18. See Derechos Human Rights, Press Release, May 21, 1999 (on file with author)
(noting Italian court indictment of Argentinean military members for kidnapping, mur-
der, and disappearance of Italian citizens in Argentina).
19. National Tribunal, Criminal Chamber in Plenary, Appellate no. 173/98-first
section, sumario 1/98, Order, Madrid, 5 Nov. 1998 (confirming Spanish jurisdiction to
try former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet for genocide, including torture, and
terrorism committed against Chilean nationals in Chile).
20. See Andreas Ziegler, InternationalDecisions: In re G., Military Tribunal, 92 AM.J.
lNT'L L. 78 (1998) (noting Bosnian Serb prosecuted in Switzerland for war crimes com-
mitted against civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
21. See Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) (confirming U.K jurisdic-
tion to extradite to Spain former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet for torture
committed against Chilean nationals in Chile); see also Pursuit of Justice, TIMES
(London), Apr. 3, 1999 (regarding British prosecution of Belarussian for war crimes
against Jews in Belarus during World War II).
22. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he tor-
turer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind.").
23. Adjudicatory jurisdiction, or jurisdiction to prosecute, is used in this Essay to
mean judicial jurisdiction to try persons who have committed certain crimes. It differs
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versal jurisdiction over genocide,24 crimes against humanity,25
and serious war crimes.26 Such crimes, in other words, are so
grave and offensive to all of humanity, that they may be prose-
cuted by any state that obtains custody of the accused, without
regard to the nationality of perpetrator or victim, location of the
crime, or other specific link to the prosecuting state. 2 7 As used
in this Essay, then, "universal jurisdiction" is exercised when a
state prosecutes crimes committed outside its borders, without
regard to the nationality of perpetrator or victim, location of
crime, or other specific link to the prosecuting state. If U.S.
courts, however, are to be equipped to preempt ICC jurisdiction,
then their jurisdiction over crimes within the ICC Statute should
not be limited to crimes committed outside the United States,
but should cover crimes committed inside the United States as
well211
In addition to universal jurisdiction, international law also
recognizes the right of states to prosecute crimes committed
from prescriptive jurisdiction, the authority to make law applicable, and enforcement
jurisdiction, the authority to compel compliance and to remedy violations. See generally
Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 785,
786 (1988).
24. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997); U.S. Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, S. Exec. Rep. No. 98-50, at 12 (1984); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter "RS"]; Lee Steven, Genocide and the Duty To Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States
Is in Breach of Its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425, 450-61 (1999); Randall,
supra note 23, at 834-37.
25. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985); M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 510-27 (1992); Re-
gina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701; Meron, supra note 12, at 568; Polyukhovich v. Com-
monwealth, 172 C.L.R. 501 (1991) (Austl.).
26. See RS, supra note 24, § 702; U.S. DEPT. ARMv FIELD MANUAL 27-10, The Law of
Land Warfare, at 506(c) (1956); Randall, supra note 23, at 816-18; Ziegler, supra note 20;
Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (granting universal jurisdiction over grave breaches
of Geneva Conventions).
27. See generally RS, supra note 24, §§ 404, 423; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 304-05 (4th ed. 1990); Randall, supra note 23. Universal jurisdic-
tion over extraterritorial offenses need not be, and in practice often is not, literally
"universal" in the sense of covering purely domestic offenses as well. See U.S. v. Rezaq,
134 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (granting universal jurisdiction over air
hijacking "outside" United States); U.S. v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (hos-
tage-taking Convention "exempts most purely domestic hostage taking"). Compare, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1203(b) (1) (1999) (taking hostage outside United States), with id. at (b) (2)
(having different provisions for hostage taking inside United States).
28. See infra, part Ill.A.
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within their territories, "territorial" jurisdiction,29 or, if commit-
ted outside their territories, crimes whose perpetrator is a na-
tional of the prosecuting state "nationality" or "personality" juris-
diction, 0 or whose victim is a national of the prosecuting state
"passive personality" jurisdiction, 1 or crimes involving an act
committed outside their territory that affects their sovereign in-
terests "protective" or "effects" jurisdiction.3 2
II. JURISDICTION OF U.S. COURTS TO PROSECUTE
ICC CR[MES33
The fact that international law authorizes states to exercise
certain adjudicatory jurisdiction over international crimes does
not mean that U.S. courts may, without more, exercise such ju-
risdiction. Under U.S. law our courts may exercise only such ad-
judicatory authority as is conferred upon them by U.S. law to
prosecute crimes codified in U.S. law.34 With regard to crimes
within the ICC Statute, current U.S. law provides only partial ju-
risdictional and codification coverage:
" Genocide is codified by U.S. law, but may be prosecuted by
U.S. courts only if the crime is committed in the United
States or the offender is a U.S. national.35
• Crimes against humanity are not codified as such in the
United States. If committed in the United States, how-
ever, then such crimes would violate domestic criminal
laws against murder, aggravated assault, or the like. If
committed outside the United States, then crimes against
humanity may be prosecuted in U.S. courts only if they
29. See RS, supra note 24, § 402, cmt. b; BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 300.
30. See RS, supra note 24, §§ 402(2), 421(2) (d)-(f); BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at
303.
31. See RS, supra note 24, § 402, cmt. g; BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 303-04; S.S.
Lotus 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A), No. 10. Passive personality jurisdiction may be limited to
cases where the prosecuting state has a particularly strong interest in the crime. RS,
supra, § 402, at cmt. g.
32. See RS, supra note 24, § 402(3); BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 304;JORDAN PAUST
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 1270 (1996).
33. "U.S. courts" in this Essay refers to civilian courts established under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution, with full due process safeguards. Military court-martials are
not considered except where referred to expressly.
34. See RS, supra note 24, § 404 reporter's note; see also Randall, supra note 23, at
796 n.66.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (1999).
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involve torture or attempted torture,36 or certain forms of
international terrorism.
* War crimes: Under current law some but not all war
crimes may be prosecuted by U.S. courts, regardless of
whether committed within or outside the United States,
but only when the perpetrator or victim is a U.S. national
or member of the U.S. armed forces.3" In addition, gen-
eral court-martials have universal jurisdiction over crimes
against the law of war. 9
U.S. courts thus have an uneven, incoherent patchwork of juris-
diction and codification of crimes within the ICC Statute. In
terms of the jurisdictional bases allowed by international law:
* Universal jurisdiction: U.S. courts have universal jurisdic-
tion over torture and certain forms of international ter-
36. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1999), U.S courts have jurisdiction over torture
committed outside the United States if the alleged offender is a U.S. national or "is
present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged
offender." Id. § 2340A(b).
37. U.S. courts have jurisdiction over at least the following crimes committed
outside the United States, referred to in this Essay as "certain forms of international
terrorism," for example: destruction of aircraft, 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1999); violence at inter-
national airports, id. § 37; threats and violence against foreign officials, official guests
and internationally protected persons, id. §§ 112, 878, 1116; hostage taking, id. § 1203;
piracy, id. § 1653; violence against ships, id. § 2280; violence against fixed maritime
platforms, id. § 2281; terrorism transcending national boundaries which seriously
harms persons or property in the United States, id. § 2340A; and air hijacking, 49
U.S.C. § 46502 (1999). The basis ofjurisdiction vary as follows:
1. Universal: see 18 U.S.C. §§32(b)(4), 37(b)(2), 112(e)(3), 878(d)(3),
1116(c) (3), 1203(b) (1) (B), 1651, 2280(b) (1) (C), 2280(b)(2), 2281 (b) (3) (1999);
49 U.S.C. § 46502(b) (2) (C) (1999).
2. Nationality: see 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(b)(4), 37(b)(2), 112(e)(2), 878(d)(2),
1116(c)(2), 1203(b)(1)(A), 2280(b)(1)(A)(iii), 2281(b)(1)(B) (1999); 49 U.S.C.
§ 46502(b) (2) (B) (1999).
3. Passive Personality: see 18 U.S.C. §§32(b)(4), 37(b)(2), 1203(b)(1)(A),
2280(b)(1)(B), 2281(b)(2) (1999); 49 U.S.C. § 46502(b)(2)(A) (1999).
4. Protective: see 18 U.S.C. §§ 112(e)(1), 878(d)(1), 1116(c)(1), 1203(b)(1)(C),
2280(b) (1) (A) (1), 2280 (b) (3), 2281 (b) (1) (C), 2332b(b) (1), 2332b(e) (1999).
For decisions upholding universal jurisdiction under such statutes, see, e.g., U.S. v.
Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1130-32 (finding universal jurisdiction over air piracy); see also
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding universal and
passive personality jurisdiction over hostage taking and universal jurisdiction over air
hijacking).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (1999).
39. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 201 (f) (1) (B) (i) (1998).
General courts-martial may try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by
military tribunal for any crime against: (a) The law of war; see also id. at 202 (b) ("Noth-
ing in this rule limits the power of general courts-martial to try persons under the law of
war.").
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rorism, but not over genocide, war crimes, or other
crimes against humanity. In addition, general court-mar-
tials have universal jurisdiction over crimes against the law
of war.
* Territorial jurisdiction: U.S. courts have jurisdiction based
on the commission of the crime within U.S. territory, re-
gardless of the nationality of the victim or perpetrator, in
cases of genocide, but not in cases of crimes against hu-
manity or war crimes.
" Nationality jurisdiction: U.S. courts have jurisdiction over
perpetrators who are U.S. nationals, regardless of where
the crime is committed, if they commit genocide, certain
war crimes, certain forms of international terrorism, but
not if they commit other war crimes or other crimes
against humanity.
" Passive personality jurisdiction: U.S. courts have jurisdic-
tion if the victim is a U.S. national, regardless of where
the crime is committed, in cases of certain war crimes or
certain forms of international terrorism, but not in cases
of genocide, other war crimes, or other crimes against hu-
manity.
" Protective jurisdiction: U.S. courts can prosecute certain
forms of international terrorism committed overseas,
based on their effects on victims or property in the
United States or on U.S. sovereignty interests.
The current, ad hoc accumulation of U.S. jurisdiction to prose-
cute crimes within the ICC Statute leaves unsettling gaps and in-
consistencies. For example:
* Pol Pot: In 1997 Cambodia briefly requested the United
Nations to establish an international criminal tribunal to
try Pol Pot for his slaughter of more than a million
Cambodians. Since the Chinese would veto a U.N. tribu-
nal in the Security Council, the United States tried to
have Pol Pot put on trial in another country. But the
United States had no laws granting U.S. courts jurisdic-
tion to prosecute his crimes against humanity. The U.S.
Department of State was reduced to imploring Canada,
Denmark, Israel, and Spain, all of which have such laws,
to take jurisdiction, but was turned down.4" Pol Pot was
40. See William A. Schabas, Follow-up to Rome: Preparing for Entry into Force of the
1999]
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never credibly prosecuted for his monstrous crimes.4"
* Saddam Hussein's Lieutenants: In 1999, the United States
reportedly pressed Austria to arrest and prosecute a se-
nior Iraqi official who came to that country for medical
treatment. But the official fled to Iraq before any arrest.4 2
Suppose he had come to the United States. Our courts
would have had no jurisdiction to prosecute him for
crimes against humanity against the Iraqi people or the
Kurds. Only if he could be charged for torture, certain
forms of international terrorism, or for war crimes against
U.S. nationals or soldiers, would U.S. courts have jurisdic-
tion to prosecute him. Nor could civilian U.S. courts
prosecute him for war crimes against the Kuwaitis. A gen-
eral court-martial could try him, but only for war crimes.
A U.S. military trial of an Iraqi officer, rightly or wrongly,
would be widely viewed as lacking independence and im-
partiality.
* Genocide in Rwanda: Foreigners who commit genocide
and then come to the United States cannot be prosecuted
here, no matter how many people they may have killed.
Consider, for example, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a
Rwandan clergyman allegedly responsible for massacres
of Tutsis in Rwanda during 1994, who later fled to Texas
where he was apprehended." U.S. courts have no juris-
diction to prosecute him for genocide. Fortunately, the
United Nations has established an ad hoc international tri-
bunal for the Rwandan genocide.44 But what if he came
from Burundi, where there is also tribal violence, but no
international tribunal?
" Violence against U.S. nationals overseas: Even if U.S. nation-
als are victimized by an overseas genocide, the result is
the same: U.S. courts have no jurisdiction to prosecute
foreigners for genocide committed overseas. If the geno-
cide involves torture or happens to take place in a war
International Criminal Court Statute, 20 HUM. RTs. L.J. 157, 160 (1999); Heather Scoffield,
Canada Looks for UN Sanction on Pol Pot Trial, HERALD (Glasgow),June 25, 1997; Stephen
Marks, Elusive Justice for the Victims of Khmer Rouge, 52J. INT'L AFF. 691, 701-03 (1999).
41. See generally id.
42. John Lancaster, United States Steps up Efforts To Prosecute Top Iraqis, WASH. POST,
Oct. 28, 1999, at A26.
43. See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1999).
44. See id. at 421 n.1.
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zone, then the perpetrators could be prosecuted here for
torture or for some but not all war crimes. But if it were
committed in peacetime, and the victims summarily exe-
cuted and not tortured, then U.S. courts would have no
jurisdiction to prosecute any crime. Thus, for example,
even if the irregulars who recently killed U.S. tourists at a
nature reserve in Uganda were caught in the United
States, U.S. courts might have no jurisdiction to prosecute
them for the murders.
45
III. THE NEED TO CLOSE THE GAP
The foregoing examples, unfortunately, can easily be multi-
plied. As they illustrate, there is a need to close the gap between
U.S. and ICC jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, crimes against
humanity, and serious war crimes. For the reasons described be-
low, this gap should be closed, regardless of whether the United
States ultimately chooses to join the ICC, and independently of
whether, in the meantime, the United States supports, opposes
or takes a neutral posture toward the ICC.
At least in the short run, the United States appears unlikely
to ratify the treaty establishing the ICC.4 6 Even so, the mere
existence of an ICC, with or without US participation, alters the
legal landscape in ways that argue for granting U.S. courts uni-
versal jurisdiction over crimes within the ICC Statute.
A. Preempting ICC Jurisdiction over U.S. Nationals
Under the Rome Statute, the ICC will have jurisdiction to
prosecute nationals of non-state parties for crimes committed on
the territory of state parties, 47 or on the territory of states that
consent to the ICC's jurisdiction.48
45. See 2 Americans Among 8 Slain in Uganda Forest, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at Al.
Conceivably the killers could be prosecuted for war crimes, but prosecutors would have
to establish that this area of Uganda, which was otherwise at peace, was a war zone. See
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Int'l Crim. Trib. for former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judg-
ment of July 15, 1999 (Appeals Chamber).
46. Scheffer, supra note 6.
47. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.2(a) (1998). Situations involving crimes by
nationals of non-state parties may also be referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security
Council. Id. at art. 13 (b). The United States, however, could veto referrals involving
U.S. nationals.
48. Id. at art. 12.3 (permiting non-state parties to accept ICC jurisdiction "with
respect to the crime in question"). The United States properly objects that this permits
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More broadly, the United States also objects that ICC juris-
diction over nationals of non-state parties violates international
law.49 Professor Michael Scharf argues persuasively that this ob-
jection is not well-founded. 0 The ICC, however, may exercise
this jurisdiction only on a "complementary" basis, meaning that
it must defer to national prosecutions, including those by non-
state parties."1
Thus, even if the United States does not join the ICC, U.S.
nationals will remain subject to ICCjurisdiction in some circum-
stances. The United States, however, can preempt ICC jurisdic-
tion by investigating the case itself and, if warranted, prosecuting
its national.5 2 If the United States investigates but then deter-
mines that no prosecution is warranted, ICC jurisdiction is still
ousted, unless the ICC determines that the U.S. decision "re-
sulted from the unwillingness or inability of the [United States]
genuinely to prosecute."5 Tests for "unwillingness or inability"
are strictly defined in the ICC Statute.54
U.S. capacity to prosecute is thus key to avoiding exercise of
ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals or over other cases where
the United States has an interest in investigation or prosecution.
But as noted above, current U.S. law does not grant U.S. courts
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity (except for
torture and certain forms of international terrorism) committed
outside the United States. Nor do U.S. courts presently have ju-
risdiction to prosecute all war crimes committed against foreign-
one-way consent, i.e., a dictator could consent to ICCjurisdiction over an alleged crime
by a U.S. soldier, without exposing his own actions to ICCjurisdiction. As of this writ-
ing, it appears likely that the ICC preparatory commission will find a way to remedy this
imbalance, by permitting non-states parties to refer only "situations" to the ICC. See
Ruth Wedgwood, Speech Three: Improve the International Criminal Court, in TOWARD AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 69 (1994).
49. Scheffer, supra note 6; Morris, supra note 6.
50. Scharf, supra note 5.
51. ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17.1 (a)-(c); 18; 19.2 (b); 20.3.
52. Id. arts. 17.1 (a) and (b); 18.
53. Id. art. 17.1 (b).
54. Inability exists only if the ICC finds a "total or substantial collapse or unavaila-
bility of [the] national judicial system ...." Id. art. 17.3. It makes it highly unlikely that
the ICC would take jurisdiction if the United States has already done so. Unwillingness
can be found only if the ICC determines that the decision "was made for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility," or there was an unjusti-
fied delay or lack of independence or impartiality in the proceedings, in circumstances
"inconsistent with an intent to bring the persons concerned to justice." Id. art. 17.2(a)-
(c).
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ers outside the United States, by U.S. nationals who are not
members of the armed forces.55 In either case, U.S. courts
would be helpless to preempt ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nation-
als, unless U.S. law is amended to expand the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.
But how can U.S. court jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
against humanity be expanded, when U.S. law does not codify
crimes against humanity as crimes? Conceivably, jurisdiction
could be conferred over a range of existing U.S. crimes when
committed by U.S. nationals abroad.56 But even if such extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction were granted over a host of common
crimes-a dubious extension of ordinary criminal jurisdiction-
the result would not necessarily enable U.S. courts to preempt
ICC jurisdiction, because the elements of common crimes differ
from those of crimes against humanity.57 The simplest and sur-
est way to give U.S. courts preemptive jurisdiction over ICC pro-
ceedings against U.S. nationals is to give U.S. courts jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity and the other crimes defined in
the ICC Statute, when committed by U.S. nationals abroad.
B. Protecting Other U.S. Interests
The foregoing would require granting U.S. courts national-
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b), (c) (1999). For those war crimes defined in section
(c), U.S. courts have jurisdiction over all U.S. nationals acting abroad. But as discussed
below, other war crimes are not covered by section (c), for which U.S. nationals acting
abroad, who are not members of the armed forces, are beyond the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.
56. Crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute involve widespread or system-
atic attacks directed against a civilian population, by means of murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, unlawful imprisonment, torture, rape,
and other sexual violence, discriminatory persecutions, enforced disappearances,
apartheid, and other inhumane acts. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.1.
57. Id. at art. 17.1(a). This article ousts the ICC ofjurisdiction when "the case" is
being investigated by a state. Would a U.S. "case" for mass murder be the same as an
ICC "case" for crimes against humanity? See id. art. 17.1(a). Article 18 requires that the
ICC prosecutor, before beginning an investigation, notify all states which "would nor-
mally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned." Id. art. 18. If the "crimes con-
cerned" are crimes against humanity, and the United States does not codify such
crimes, then can it be said that the United States would "normally" exercise jurisdiction
over them? Id. Article 20.3 bars ICC trials of persons who have already been tried by
another court for the "same conduct." Id. art. 20.3. Is the "conduct" tried in a U.S.
murder case the same as that in an ICC case for crimes against humanity? The answers
are not clear. Cf. U.S. v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1128-30 (1998) (stating that Maltese
conviction for murder and hostage taking does not bar subsequent U.S. prosecution for
air piracy, because some elements of offenses differ).
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ityjurisdiction over the crimes in the ICC Statute. But there may
also be other categories of crimes that the United States has an
interest in prosecuting, for which current law does not afford
jurisdiction. These categories include crimes against humanity
committed in the United States, which would require territorial
jurisdiction; genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war
crimes committed against U.S. nationals abroad, which would re-
quire passive personality jurisdiction; and such crimes abroad af-
fecting U.S. sovereign interests, which would require protective ju-
risdiction.
There are also crimes that may not fit in any of these catego-
ries, but where the United States may have a strong foreign pol-
icy interest in asserting jurisdiction. As suggested by the exam-
ples in the preceding section, the United States may wish to be
in a position to prosecute the likes of Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein,
and Rwandan genocidaires, even for crimes not directly involving
the United States or its nationals. To do so, U.S. courts would
require universaljurisdiction, which they already have for torture
and certain forms of international terrorism, enabling them to
try such criminals who may be found in or lawfully brought to
the United States.58 In short, if the United States wishes to have
the option of preempting ICC jurisdiction in the full range of
cases in which it may have investigative or prosecutorial interest,
U.S. courts should be granted universal jurisdiction over the
crimes in the ICC Statute.
Some might object that such broad universal jurisdiction
could entangle the United States in unwanted foreign policy dis-
putes. The objection, however, is unwarranted. The executive
branch would retain prosecutorial discretion in each case over
whether to investigate or, instead, to allow the ICC to assume
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction of U.S. courts over ICC
58. Universal jurisdiction generally may be exercised by U.S. courts even though a
defendant's presence in the U.S. is secured involuntarily. See Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1130-32;
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991). U.S. courts recognize
exceptions where the transfer to the United States would violate a treaty, (United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992)), and possibly in "very limited" cases
where the person detained is subjected to "torture, brutality, and similar outrageous
conduct." Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1130, (quoting Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1092-93 and U.S. ex rel.
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1975)). More broadly, in this author's view, if
U.S. courts are to uphold the rule of law and human rights by prosecuting crimes
within the ICC Statute, their jurisdiction should be limited to cases where a defendant's
presence in the United States is secured by lawful means.
THE ICC'S NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE
crimes would add flexibility, not rigidity, to U.S. foreign policy.59
C. Fighting Impunity
In addition to preempting ICC jurisdiction, protecting or
punishing U.S. nationals, protecting U.S. territory and sovereign
interests, and providing the United States added foreign policy
flexibility, universal jurisdiction in U.S. courts is also important
to make real the U.S. commitment to end impunity for those
who commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war
crimes.6" Like our European allies who have recently prosecuted
foreign nationals found in their territories for such crimes com-
mitted in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,6 the United States must be in
a position to do its part to bring international outlaws to justice.
It might be objected that the advent of the ICC renders ex-
panded U.S. jurisdiction over such crimes unnecessary. But not
all such crimes can or should be prosecuted by the ICC:
" First, the ICC's jurisdiction will be prospective only.6 2 It
thus cannot prosecute crimes committed in the 1990s, for
example, no matter how horrendous and demanding of
punishment.
" Even for future crimes, the ICC may be unable to take
jurisdiction. In cases initiated by the prosecutor or by
state parties, its jurisdiction may be blocked by lack of
consent by the state of nationality or territoriality.63 This
situation will make it difficult for the ICC to prosecute
rulers who repress their own people, since in such cases
the states of nationality and territoriality are one and the
same, and the ruler will not likely consent to his own pros-
ecution.
* In cases initiated by the Security Council, referral to the
ICC may be vetoed.64
59. Two persistent critics of civil suits to enforce international human rights in
U.S. courts on the ground that such suits, controlled by private plaintiffs, may interfere
with U.S. foreign policy, distinguish criminal prosecutions, controlled by the executive,
which has the "duty, expertise and discretion to accommodate such foreign relations
concerns." Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2129, 2158-81 (1999).
60. See supra note 9.
61. See supra notes 12, 14, 16, 20.
62. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 11.
63. Id. art. 12.2, 3.
64. Id. art. 13 (b).
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* Moreover, even when the ICC does gain jurisdiction, its
resources will be limited. Both for this reason, and be-
cause the ICC is intended to focus on only the most seri-
ous cases, there may be situations where it prosecutes only
the most senior commanders, leaving lower ranking of-
fenders-who may nonetheless have committed heinous
crimes-for prosecution by national courts."
For all these reasons, the ICC cannot be expected to do the
whole job of bringing to justice those who commit atrocities.
Nor can rogue regimes be counted upon to prosecute their own
leaders. If impunity for the worst international crimes is to be
reined in, then, the potential for the United States and other de-
mocracies to exercise universal and other extraterritorial juris-
diction will remain an important option, notwithstanding the ad-
vent of the ICC.
Expanding U.S. court jurisdiction to provide universal juris-
diction over crimes in the ICC Statute would be consistent with
recent trends, in both the United States and other democracies,
to expand jurisdiction over such crimes. The United States has
recently expanded its extraterritorial jurisdiction over genocide
(1988),66 torture (1994),67 certain forms of international terror-
ism (1996),6 and war crimes (1997).6' As noted earlier, other
democracies have recently exercised universal jurisdiction over
such crimes. They are now likely to expand their jurisdictional
statutes even further, to reach the full range of crimes in the ICC
Statute.7 °
65. See id. art. 1 ("the most serious crimes of international concern"); 17.1(d)
("sufficient gravity"), 53.2(c) (same). Explaining that "[i]nvestigative resources must
... be applied . . . to high-level civilian, police and military leaders," chief prosecutor
Carla del Ponte recently declined to try nine Serbs arrested in Kosovo before the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adding that local courts would
try cases not taken to The Hague. U.N. War Crimes Prosecutor Sets Out Kosovo Strategy,
REUTERS, Sept. 29, 1999 (on file with author).
66. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606,
§ 1, 102 Stat. 3045, 18 U.S.C.S. 1091 (1999) note.
67. See Act of April 30, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, Part A, § 506(a), 108
Star. 463, 18 U.S.C.S. §2340A (1999) note.
68. Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries, April 24, 1996, P.L. 104-
132, Title VII, Subtitle A, § 702(a), 110 Star. 1291, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332b (1999).
69. Act of Nov. 26, 1997, P.L. 105-18, Title V, § 583, 111 Stat. 2436, 18 U.S.C.S.
§2441 (1999).
70. See Schabas, supra note 40, at 157. Schabas advises that:
in keeping with the principle of complementarity (preamble: 'Recalling that it
is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those respon-
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In anticipation of an ICC, a range of U.S. national interests,
reinforced by values shared by the United States and other de-
mocracies in fighting impunity for atrocities, calls for granting
U.S. courts expanded, preferably universal, jurisdiction over
crimes within the ICC Statute.
IV. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
One simple way to close the gap would be to enact a new
section of the U.S. criminal code granting federal courts univer-
sal jurisdiction over genocide, serious war crimes, and crimes
against humanity as defined in the ICC Statute. 71 The ICC statu-
tory definitions should not be incorporated by reference; rather,
their language should be repeated verbatim or substantially, to-
gether with the "elements of offenses" under the ICC Statute,
once their drafting is completed by the preparatory commission
and approved by the state parties.72
Some argue that such an approach is required for crimes
against humanity, since they are not codified by current U.S. law.
For genocide and war crimes, an alternative would be to make
simple amendments to existing legislation. The following sec-
tions address both technical and policy questions for each cate-
gory of crimes.
A. Genocide
An alternative approach is simply to expand the current
statutory jurisdiction of U.S. courts over genocide (territorial
and nationality) to make it universal. 73 Although differences
would remain between the definition of the crime under U.S.
law and the ICC Statute, in most cases these differences would
not impair the U.S. ability either to take preemptive jurisdiction
over a case, or to prosecute genocide.74
sible for international crimes'), the State's legislation should enable it to exer-
cise -its domestic jurisdiction over the crimes and individuals within the juris-
diction of the Court.
71. ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6-8.
72. Id. art. 9; Schabas, supra note 40, at 163.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (d) (1), 109(d) (2) (1999).
74. For example, the U.S. statutory definition of genocide requires intent to de-
stroy the target group in whole or "substantial part," see id. § 1091 (a), whereas the ICC
definition states merely in whole or "in part." ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6. This
distinction is unlikely to make much difference in practice.
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B. War Crimes
An alternative approach here, too, is to expand the current
statutory jurisdiction of U.S. courts over war crimes (nationality
and passive personality) to make it universal. 75 Since U.S. mili-
tary courts already have universal jurisdiction over war crimes, 76
no extension of sovereignty is required to confer such jurisdic-
tion on civilian courts as well. Moreover, because of their
stronger assurances of independence and impartiality, granting
civilian federal courts universal jurisdiction over war crimes
would be more likely to yield judgments perceived internation-
ally as fair and just.
Expanding jurisdiction in this manner, however, would not
be enough. The war crimes subject to U.S. court jurisdiction
also need to be expanded. The U.S. war crimes law currently
criminalizes only grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and violations of the common Article 3 of those Conven-
tions and of certain articles of the Annex to the 1907 Hague
Convention IV. 77 The law provides that U.S. courts will have ju-
risdiction over other war crimes-violations of the 1977 Proto-
cols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, and of the 1996 Proto-
col on Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices-only once the
United States becomes a party to those Protocols. 78 The ICC,
however, has jurisdiction over significant provisions of Protocols
I and 11. 7' There is no need to make a grant of similar jurisdic-
tion to U.S. courts dependent upon U.S. ratification, which has
been opposed for other reasons.8 0 The protocol provisions
adopted by the ICC Statute are largely incorporated in the cus-
tomary law of war."' They will be further specified by the "ele-
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (1999).
76. Id.
77. See id. § 2441(c).
78. See id. § 2441(c)(1), (3), (4).
79. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8 (b) (stating violations in international
armed conflict, corresponding to Protocol I and to Hague regulations); see id. art. 8 (e)
(stating violations in armed conflicts not of international character, corresponding to
Protocol 1I); Schabas, supra note 40, at 164-65.
80. See Scharf, supra note 5, at 28-29.
81. Statement of the United States in U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 at 15, reproduced in
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 451 (1995) (Protocol I); Int. Crim.Trib. for
former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Tadic case, Decision of 2 October 1995, IT Doc.
IT-94-1-AR72, at 63 (Protocol II). As Professor Scharf concludes, "While a few of the
Rome Statute's definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes may technically
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ments of offenses" insisted upon by U.S. negotiators and which
are currently being drafted for the ICC.82 To the extent U.S.
negotiators are satisfied with the final version of the elements,8"
U.S. courts should be given universal jurisdiction over these
crimes as defined in the ICC Statute.
C. Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity, on the other hand, are not cur-
rently codified in U.S. criminal law. The simplest approach is to
add a new statutory provision incorporating the text of Article 7
of the ICC Statute and the elements of offenses, once adopted,
to the extent acceptable to U.S. negotiators. The crimes against
humanity in the ICC Statute-widespread or systematic attacks
on a civilian population, by means of murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, unlaw-
ful imprisonment, torture, rape or sexual violence, discrimina-
tory persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, or other
similar inhumane acts-do not appear to be problematic for the
United States.84
D. Responsibility of Civilian Superiors
To the extent the U.S. court jurisdiction is expanded over
ICC crimes, it should be designed to ensure that U.S. courts can
take cases that might otherwise go to the ICC. It would be pru-
dent for U.S. law, like the ICC Statute, to hold civilian superiors
criminally responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, when committed by subordinates under their
"effective authority and control, as a result of [their] failure to
go beyond these precedents, this is but a small step in the nature of defining the con-
tent of crimes that have long been recognized as warranting universal jurisdiction."
Scharf, supra note 5, at 32.
82. See Scheffer, supra note 6, at 17; Schabas, supra note 40, at 161, 164-66.
83. One provision that has caused concern is the prohibition of the "transfer, di-
rectly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into
the territory it occupies . . . ." ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.2 (b) (viii). Professor
Wedgwood suggests that this provision should be interpreted to extend "no further
than the existing Geneva Conventions" and notes that the United States has proposed
language to restrict its reach to "situations where the transfer 'endangers the separate
identity of the local population."' She explains that this language will leave the question
of Israeli settlements to peace negotiations between the parties. See Wedgwood, supra
note 48, at 70.
84. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.1; see also Scheffer, supra note 6, at 16.
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exercise control properly over such subordinates," where the
superiors are at fault.85 Unless the United States can prosecute
civilians in such circumstances, they will be vulnerable to poten-
tial prosecution before the ICC. Since military superiors are al-
ready bound by command responsibility, no additional legisla-
tion is needed for the U.S. military.86
CONCLUSION
Genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes,
wherever they may be committed, offend all nations and all peo-
ples. In the last decade of the twentieth century, democracies
including the United States have increasingly assumed and acted
upon commitments to ensure that perpetrators of these crimes
do not escape justice. U.S. legislation to permit our courts to
prosecute such offenses, even when committed outside our bor-
ders, has steadily expanded. European democracies have prose-
cuted foreign nationals for committing these crimes in far away
places, against far away peoples.
One might anticipate that an International Criminal Court
would reduce the need for national courts to take such cases.
On the contrary, the ICC Statute makes the role of national
courts even more important. In part this is due to national self-
interest. Under the ICC Statute, regardless of whether the
United States joins the ICC, the United States is entitled to take
preemptive jurisdiction over cases in which it has an interest.
The United States cannot exercise that right, however, unless
our courts have jurisdiction to hear those cases. Their present,
uneven, and incomplete jurisdiction falls well short of what they
need.
Expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in such cases
serves not only national interests, but also national values. This
85. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 28.2. This article holds such superiors criminally
responsible only if three further conditions are met:
(a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit
such crimes; (b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and (c) The superior failed to take
all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.
Id.
86. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 26, § 501, at 178.
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scheme is an instance where our interests and values happily co-
incide. If the United States is to make good on its shared com-
mitment to fight impunity for these most serious international
crimes, then U.S. courts must have the necessary jurisdiction to
do the job. Because of its own statutory and resource limitations,
the ICC will not be able to bring to justice all who commit crimes
within its jurisdiction-especially dictators who oppress their
own people. U.S. and other national courts, then, must be avail-
able alternatives. Only in this way will the executive branch have
the legal capacity to do its part in the fight against impunity.
Only in this way will repressive rulers in the next century face
ever higher odds of being held to account for their crimes
against humanity.
